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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
GILBERT LORETTO, : Case No. 960622-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment 
of conviction entered July 23, 1996. This Court has jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err by refusing to strike 
the jury panel after they heard prejudicial remarks by a 
prospective juror that Loretto's hair and clothing styles were 
like those of Mexican gang members? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion for a mistrial will not be overturned absent an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel moved to strike 
the jury panel based on the prejudicial nature of the juror's 
remarks about Appellant's hair and clothing. R. 271. 
ISSUE II: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction based upon accomplice liability in the absence of any 
evidence that Appellant contributed to the commission of the 
robbery other than his presence at the scene of the crime? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court will reverse a criminal 
case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel moved to dismiss 
at the close of the State's case on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish accomplice liability. R. 354. 
ISSUE III: Did the trial court commit prejudicial error 
by giving the jury an instruction containing the statutory 
definition of robbery in addition to an elements instruction? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's instructions to 
the jury are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference. 
Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine, 
when considered as a whole, whether they fairly instruct the jury 
on the applicable law. Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 
1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel objected to 
Instruction 14 on the grounds that it was repetitive and unfairly 
emphasized certain aspects of the case. R. 362-63. 
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court err by refusing to provide 
the jury with a reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction 
because the reasonable doubt instruction did not adequately 
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define the concept, minimized the importance of reasonable doubt, 
and suggested that the jury could convict on less evidence? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's instructions to 
the jury are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference. 
Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine, 
when considered as a whole, whether they fairly instruct the jury 
on the applicable law. Smoot, 921 P.2d at 1006. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel submitted a 
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction and objected to the 
reasonable doubt instruction on the grounds that it did not 
adequately define the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
R. 361-62. 
ISSUE V: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
refusing to grant defense counsel's motion to continue the trial 
because she had only just received information regarding a 
potential defense witness's whereabouts and needed additional 
time to interview him? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's denial of a motion 
to continue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: Defense counsel requested a 
continuance on May 31, 1996 on the grounds that she had recently 
discovered information that could lead to the whereabouts of a 
potential defense witness. R. 192-94. 
TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
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The pertinent parts of the following constitutional 
provisions and statutes are contained in Addendum A: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 6, 1996, the Appellant, Gilbert Loretto 
("Loretto" or "Appellant") was convicted of aggravated robbery, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), a first degree 
felony. On July 23, 1996, Judge Frank Noel sentenced Appellant 
to serve five years to life at the Utah State Prison, pay a 
$1,000.00 fine and 85% surcharge, and $300.00 recoupment fee. 
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on August 1, 1996. The Utah 
Supreme Court poured over disposition of Loretto's appeal to this 
Court on September 27, 1996. 
FACTS 
On January 10, 1995 Carrie Flores ("Flores") was robbed 
at knife point in the parking lot of the Smith's supermarket on 
7800 South State Street. Just prior to the robbery, Flores 
bought groceries and paid with a $50.00 bill. R. 305. While she 
was in line, she noticed three Hispanic men in line behind her. 
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Flores identified Loretto as one of the three men who were behind 
her at the check out stand. R. 3 04. After paying for her 
groceries, Flores left the store and walked to her car which was 
parked about 40-50 feet away from the store. R. 305-307. Flores 
put the groceries in the passenger side of the vehicle and walked 
around to the driver's side of the vehicle. R. 306-307. The 
three men, including Loretto, were standing directly in front of 
her. R. 306. One man was holding a knife. He was about a foot 
away from her. Loretto stood directly behind and to the right of 
the man with the knife, less than a foot away from Flores. R. 
307-08. The third man was standing behind and directly to the 
left of the man with the knife. R. 3 07. The man with the knife 
held the three inch blade about four inches from her chest, and 
demanded that she give him the change from the 50.00 bill. R. 
308-09. Flores heard Loretto either laughing or mumbling, she 
could not tell which. R. 3 09. Flores gave the man with the 
knife the money. R. 310-11. Later Flores identified Loretto in 
a photo spread. R. 311-12. Loretto did not threaten Flores, 
verbally encourage the man with knife, brandish a weapon, or take 
the money. R. 311, 316-19. | 
Sherman Lloyd with the Midvale Police Department was 
working off duty at Smiths, knows Loretto and saw him with two 
other Hispanic males that evening. R. 299-300. Melissa Larez, 
("Larez") a Smith's employee, knows Loretto and his home address. 
Larez remembered chatting with Loretto while he stood in line 
with the other men behind Flores. R. 333-37. Larez said Loretto 
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mostly paid attention to her and not the others while waiting in 
line. R. 326-27. Larez testified that Loretto had come in the 
store on prior occasions. R. 337. In fact, Officer Roxburgh 
with the Midvale Police Department arrested Loretto for this 
offense at the same Smith's store two days later. R. 343. 
Sherry Burbidge, a cashier at Smiths, also testified that 
she recalled checking Flores' groceries. R. 326-27. She 
remembered seeing Loretto with two other Hispanic men in line 
behind Flores. R. 328. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During voir dire, a prospective juror stated that she was 
biased against Loretto because he was the same age as her son who 
had recently committed suicide and because his hair and clothing 
styles were like those of a Mexican neighbor involved in gangs. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to grant 
defense counsel's motion to strike the panel. The juror's 
comments were prejudicial for two reasons. One, jurors may have 
been influenced by her strong, emotional expressions of bias, and 
two, the jurors heard what amounted to outside evidence regarding 
hair and clothing styles of Mexican gang members. The trial 
court's single question to jurors asking if they could be fair 
was inadequate to remedy the taint. Because the jury heard 
extraneous evidence, there is a presumption of prejudice. 
Loretto was also actually prejudiced by the remarks because he is 
an Hispanic male who was accused of aiding and abetting in the 
commission of a robbery by two other Mexican men. 
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There was insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of 
guilty based on accomplice liability. The only evidence that 
Loretto was a party to the crime was his close proximity to the 
robber and victim during the commission of the offense. Mere 
presence at the scene of a crime where the actor contributes 
nothing to the doing of the act is insufficient to establish 
accomplice liability. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error by giving the 
jury an instruction defining the offense of robbery in addition 
to the elements instruction. The State was not entitled to 
repetitious instructions. Loretto was prejudiced because the 
repetition of the elements of the crime emphasized that aspect of 
the case and minimized the more important issue of whether there 
was sufficient evidence to find him guilty as an accomplice to 
the crime. 
The trial court should have granted Appellant's request 
for a reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction because the 
reasonable doubt instruction was confusing, misleading, and did 
not adequately define the concept. Appellant should be granted a 
new trial because the reasonable doubt instruction could have 
been applied by jurors in a way that violates the Constitution. 
The instruction implies that the defendant is guilty and that 
proof of guilt must be merely satisfactory. The instruction as a 
whole tends to minimize the State's burden of proof and 
discourages the jury from attempting to apply the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the evidence. 
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The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
grant defense counsel a continuance five days prior to trial. It 
was abuse of discretion to deny the request for continuance on 
the grounds that counsel could not proffer what the proposed 
witness's testimony would be, when counsel had only just received 
information that could aid in locating the witness, and was 
requesting additional time so she could interview him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, THE ENTIRE JURY PANEL WAS TAINTED BY A 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S STATEMENT DURING VOIR DIRE 
THAT APPELLANT'S HAIR AND CLOTHING STYLE WERE 
LIKE THOSE OF MEXICAN GANG MEMBERS. 
During voir dire, a prospective juror, Ms. Bingham, gave 
unsolicited information regarding her son who had recently 
committed suicide. Ms. Bingham told the court she was prejudiced 
by seeing a young man, and that she was "an emotional basket 
case." R. 211-212. When asked if she could concentrate on the 
case and evaluate the evidence, Ms. Bingham replied: 
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door 
to a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and 
he--he dressed just like he did. I can't 
understand. Why can't he shave that thing off 
the back of his head? I'm sorry. I don't know 
if I could be fair. (The jury (sic) was 
referring to the defendant at this point). 
R. 211-232. The juror was referring to Loretto's hair style 
which was longer at the back of the neck. R. 272-73. Mr. 
Loretto is Hispanic. R. 3 04. Defense counsel moved to quash the 
panel. R. 2 71. The court denied the motion to quash the panel, 
but agreed to question the panel about Ms. Bingham's comments. 
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R. 275. The court asked the panel if anyone felt "they were 
influenced by those comments of Mrs. Bingham in a way that would 
make it difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon 
her comments?" R. 281. No one responded. R. 281. The court 
did not ask any additional questions. R. 281. See Addendum B 
for a copy of the portions of the transcript cited above. 
Ms. Bingham's remarks presented the court with a two 
fold problem. One, the panel heard outside evidence that Mexican 
gang members who lived by Ms. Bingham wore clothing and hair 
styles like Loretto. Second, the panel may have reacted to and 
identified with Ms. Bingham's bias and also felt some bias 
towards Loretto. The trial court's questioning of the 
prospective jurors after he had denied defense counsel's motion 
to quash the panel was an inadequate remedy. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 
and Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution require that the 
jury's verdict be based on evidence received in court and not 
from outside sources. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351, 
86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Marshall v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). Both 
the Utah and United States Constitutions guarantee trial by an 
impartial jury. State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985) .1 
In this case, the jury heard what amounted to outside 
evidence that Loretto's hair and clothing styles were like those 
1
. The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution. 
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worn by Mexican gang members. Evidence that Mexican gang members 
wore hair and clothing styles like Loretto would not have been 
admissible at trial had the State tried to introduce it under 
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it was 
irrelevant and highly prejudicial.2 
The trial court's additional voir dire did nothing to 
alleviate the problem of having the jury hear outside evidence 
that was not subject to cross examination, objection, 
explanation, or rebuttal. The single question asked by the court 
was inadequate to eliminate the taint from Ms. Bingham's remarks. 
See State v Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980) (one question 
is not sufficient to rebut an inference of bias); State v. 
Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (simply asking 
one question to jurors who had been victims of similar crime to 
charged crime error); State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (trial court's simple repetition of admonishment 
and plea to be fair insufficient). Cf Morgan, 865 P.2d at 1381 
(no error where the court extensively questioned each individual 
juror about potential influence of juror's expression of bias 
2
. This case is distinguishable from State v. Morgan, 865 
P. 2d 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Morgan, a juror made an 
inappropriate comment suggesting that he was predisposed to find 
the defendant guilty to another juror who reported the incident. 
After dismissing the juror, the court questioned individually each 
remaining juror. Only one juror overheard the comment, and after 
"careful inquiry" the court determined that both jurors were not 
influenced by the improper statement. Id. at 1381. The court 
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
refusing the defendant's motion for a mistrial. JEd. Unlike this 
case, the jurors in Morgan were not exposed to outside information 
that could have a bearing on the case. 
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against the defendant) . 
Also, the jurors were not in a position at the outset of 
the trial to determine if Ms. Bingham's remarks would affect 
their judgment because they were not aware of the facts of the 
case at that time. The jurors couldn't have known before the 
trial started that the information about Loretto's appearance 
might prove to be related to the facts and issues of the case. 
They did not know that the crucial issue in the case would be 
whether Loretto was a party to a robbery committed by two other 
Mexican males. For that reason, their assessment of their own 
impartiality at that point in time had little value. 
Once jurors have been exposed to improper outside 
influences, the jurors' denial that they were influenced is not 
sufficient to dispel the possibility of prejudice because the 
"person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to 
recognize that fact." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280-81. When "jurors 
have received extra-record information that bears upon the trial, 
a protestation of nonprejudicial effect by the juror may not be 
enough to protect the integrity of the judicial process." State 
v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983). See also. State 
v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (presumption 
of prejudice from improper contact between victim and juror was 
not overcome by court's cursory questioning and juror's assertion 
that she was not influenced); Marshall, 79 S.Ct. at 1173, 360 
U.S. at 312-13 (reversing the conviction because jurors received 
inadmissible information about the defendant's criminal record 
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from the newspaper despite the jurors' assertion to the trial 
court that they could be fair). 
The trial court erred by refusing to grant counsel's 
motion to strike the panel. Loretto's constitutional rights to 
an impartial jury and a trial free from outside influence were 
violated. The single question asked by the court did nothing to 
remedy the taint of Ms. Bingham's remarks. 
A. THE INTRODUCTION OF OUTSIDE EVIDENCE 
REGARDING LORETTO'S MANNER OF DRESS AND HAIRSTYLE 
CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE. 
Utah cases involving a juror's exposure to outside 
evidence do not reach the issue of whether such exposure creates 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. See Velasquez, 672 P.2d 
at 1264, Gee v. Smith, 541 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1975). In Velasquez 
and Gee jurors were exposed to outside evidence. In both cases 
the outside evidence was no different than evidence that had 
already been properly admitted at trial so there was no question 
of prejudice. 
However, in cases involving jurors who have improperly 
had contact with a State's witness, the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted a stringent analysis under Article I, section 10 of the 
Utah Constitution which presumes prejudice. Once the presumption 
of prejudice is raised, the burden is on the State to prove that 
the juror was not influenced. Pike, 712 P.2d at 280; Swain, 835 
P.2d at 1011. The same presumption of prejudice arises in cases 
where a juror does independent investigation of the crime during 
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the trial. State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786, 787-88 (Utah 1971).3 
These cases suggest that the presumption of prejudice should also 
apply to cases where jurors are exposed to outside evidence. In 
fact, both Hawaii and California apply a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice in cases where jurors hear extraneous evidence. 
State v. Joseph, 883 P.2d 657, 660 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1994); In re 
Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 486-87 (Cal. 1996).4 
The reasoning behind presuming prejudice in Pike, Ahrens, 
and their progeny applies with equal force in this situation. 
Pike identified two reasons for the existence of 
the rebuttable presumption. First, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove how an 
improper contact may have influenced a juror. . . 
The second reason for the presumption is that an 
improper juror contact creates an appearance of 
collusion or impropriety in the proceedings from 
which the judicial process may suffer in the eyes 
of the public. If improper juror contact is not 
prevented, a doubt may exist in the mind of the 
losing party, and the public as a whole, as to 
whether the defendant was given a fair trial. 
Swain, 835 P.2d at 1011. 
The problem of proving the influence on jurors when they 
hear extraneous information which is related to the case is 
3
. Ahrens does not specifically state that the court applied 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. But the Ahrens court noted 
that there was no way of knowing if the juror who had done outside 
investigation of the crime was influenced. Citing to State v. 
Anderson, 237 P. 941, 65 Utah 415 (1925) and State v. Crank, 142 
P.2d 178, 105 Utah 332 (1943), the court reversed the conviction. 
Anderson and Crank were the cases relied upon by the court in Pike 
which applied a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 
4
. Both California and Hawaii treat cases where jurors were 
exposed to extraneous information as structural errors which 
undermined the integrity of the trial and therefore do not apply a 
harmless error analysis. Malone, 911 P. 2d at 486-87; Joseph, 883 
P.2d at 660. 
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equally as great. Ahrens recognized that when a juror conducts 
his own investigation and as a consequence may have relied on 
outside evidence in reaching a verdict, there is no way of 
determining whether the juror's judgment was influenced. 479 
P.2d at 787. 
Lastly, "[T]he verdict of the jury, like Caesar's wife, 
must be above suspicion." Crank, 142 P.2d at 194. When jurors 
are allowed to hear information which is not presented as part of 
the trial and is therefore not subject to rebuttal, cross-
examination, or objection, the appearance of the fairness of the 
proceedings is undermined both in the eyes of the defendant and 
the public. 
Because a rebuttable presumption of prejudice attaches, 
the State has the burden of showing that the extraneous 
information did not influence the jury. The State cannot 
overcome the presumption of prejudice which arose from Ms. 
Bingham's remarks. 
B. THE PREJUDICIAL IMPACT OF MS. BINGHAM'S 
STATEMENTS WAS SO GREAT THAT EVEN IF THERE IS NO 
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE HE SHOULD BE GRANTED A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Ms. Bingham informed the jury that she had a Mexican 
neighbor who was involved in gangs and who wore clothing and hair 
styles similar to Loretto. Loretto is Hispanic. The sole issue 
in his case was whether he was a party to the robbery which was 
committed by two Mexican men. The jurors were asked to determine 
if Loretto was a participant, or just an observer. The fact 
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that, according to Ms. Bingham, Loretto looked like a Mexican 
gang member could easily have influenced their perception of him. 
Given the nature of the facts and issues of this case there is a 
substantial risk that the jury may have concluded that this was a 
gang related robbery and that Loretto was a gang member. The 
perception of Loretto as a gang member would have made it appear 
more likely that he participated in the robbery. Because Loretto 
was acutally prejudiced by the court's failure to strike the 
panel, he is entitled to new trial. 
POINT II; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT LORETTO WAS A PARTY TO THE 
OFFENSE. 
This Court will reverse a criminal case for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." 
Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State v. Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The evidence is reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568; Petree, 659 
P.2d at 444. The weight and credibility given to a witness's 
testimony is an exclusive function of the trier of fact. State 
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
Despite this high standard, every element of the offense 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court 
will not make a "speculative leap" to fill gaps in the evidence 
in order to sustain the verdict. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45; 
State in re J.S.H., 642 P.2d 386 (Utah 1982); State v. Kourbelas, 
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621 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1980).5 
Since there was no evidence that Loretto directly 
committed the offense, the only issue was whether Loretto was 
guilty as a party to the crime. There was not sufficient 
evidence to establish that Loretto was an accomplice to the 
robbery.6 
An accomplice is a person who knowingly, 
voluntarily, and with common intent with the 
principal offender, unites in the commission of 
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be 
5
 In order to sustain a challenge based on insufficient 
evidence, the appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting 
the verdict, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 
and demonstrate it is legally insufficient. State v. Gray, 851 
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In order to be concise, only 
the facts which are relevant to establishing Loretto's liability as 
a party to the offense are repeated here. A full account of the 
facts can be found in the Facts section of this brief. The 
following evidence supported the verdict: 
1. Flores identified Loretto as being present at the 
robbery. R. 3 06. 
2 . Burbidge and Larez both stated Loretto was with the men 
who committed the robbery when Flores paid for her groceries with 
cash. R. 328, 333-37. 
3. Flores was parked forty to fifty feet away from the 
store. R. 305-07. 
4. Flores was confronted immediately after leaving the 
store. R. 306. 
5. Loretto was standing less than a foot away from Flores 
when she was confronted by the man with the knife. R. 307-08. 
6. Loretto was standing directly behind the man with the 
knife. R. 307-08. 
7. Flores stated that Loretto either laughed or mumbled to 
himself during the robbery, but that she couldn't hear what he 
said. R. 309. 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
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real, not merely apparent. Mere presence 
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to 
be committed or a mental approbation while the 
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act, 
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice. 
State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951). 
State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993) provides an 
example of the principle that in order to be guilty as an 
accomplice, the defendant must actively participate in the 
commission of the crime. In Wood, the court held that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Wood was an 
accomplice to murder because he was close by the principal actor 
during the beating, he kicked the victim while he was being 
beaten to death, and there were wounds on the victim that looked 
like they were inflicted by side cutters which were found on 
Wood. Id. at 87-88. 
In contrast, the court found that there was not 
sufficient evidence to support party liability to aggravated 
sexual assault on the theory that Wood aided in the rape or 
torture of the victim with battery clamps. Id. at 88. All the 
testimony at trial indicated that Archuleta committed those acts 
and there was not physical evidence to the contrary. "Without 
more, the fact that Wood was present during these crimes is not 
enough to convict him of being an accomplice to those crimes." 
Id. 
But the court did find sufficient evidence to support 
Wood's conviction as a party to aggravated sexual assault on the 
theory that he participated in the object rape of the victim 
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because the evidence showed that while Archuleta committed the 
object rape, Wood kicked the victim. Id. See also State v. 
Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977) (mere presence at the scene 
of a crime without intent is not sufficient to find that one is 
an accomplice; State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) 
(presence at a crime with knowledge that the crime is about to be 
committed where the person "contributes nothing to the doing of 
the act" does not establish accomplice liability); State v. 
Cellists, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987) (evidence that the defendant 
was with the robber when he test drove the car that was used in 
the robbery, and minutes after the robbery the defendant returned 
the car to the lot was insufficient to establish accomplice 
liability). 
Applying the principles of accomplice liability 
enunciated in Wood, Fertig, Helm, and Gee to the case at hand, 
the only evidence suggesting that Loretto was an accomplice to 
the crime was his close proximity to the victim and the man with 
the knife. Loretto was not blocking the victim's exit, he did 
not verbally encourage the robber, he did not have a weapon, he 
did not physically or verbally threaten the victim, and he did 
not take the money. R. 308-309, 319. Though he was with the 
people who robbed Flores, there was no evidence that he knew what 
was about to take place. Indeed, the evidence suggested that he 
did not as Loretto had shopped at that Smith's store more than 
once in the past, and chatted with a sales clerk who knew his 
name and address while he waited in line with the other men 
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behind Flores. R. 320, 329, 334-38. 
At trial, the State focused on the fact that Loretto 
walked some fifty feet or so with the other men to Flores7 car. 
R. 357. The fact that Loretto walked with the other two men into 
the parking lot to Flores' car does not establish that he knew 
that they were going to rob her. Loretto could have simply 
followed the men he was with into the lot. More importantly, 
walking to Flores' car and standing close by while she was robbed 
"contributes nothing to the doing of the act" of robbery. Gee, 
498 P.2d at 665. Given the lack of evidence that Loretto 
contributed in some concrete way to the commission of the 
robbery, there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was 
a party to the offense. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING THE 










THE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
At the State's request, the trial court gave the 
statutory definition of robbery to the jury in Instruction 14 in 
addition to the elements instruction, number 15. R. 150-51, 362-
63. See Addendum C for copies of Instructions 14 and 15. The 
State was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the 
elements of robbery twice. In State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 
725 (Utah 1982) the court held that the defendant was not 
entitled to essentially two instructions on reasonable doubt 
because repeating the instruction had the effect of 
overemphasizing one point in the trial and was therefore 
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potentially misleading. Similarly, in State v. McCumber, 622 
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980) the court held that "a defendant is not 
entitled to an instruction which is redundant or repetitive of 
principles enunciated in other instructions given to the jury." 
Just as the defendant is not entitled to repetitious 
instructions, the State is likewise not entitled to repetitious 
instructions. Repetition of a jury instruction tends to place 
undue emphasis on a particular point or unduly highlight certain 
evidence. State v. White, 658 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Mont. 1983). 
Emphasizing one issue, theory or defense by repetition has the 
added effect of minimizing the importance of other evidence and 
issues. White Auto Stores v. Reyes, 223 F.2d 298, 305 (10th Cir. 
1955) . 
In many cases, there would be little harm to the 
defendant for the court to repeat the elements instruction of the 
charged crime twice to the jury. See United States v. Soria, 959 
F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 882, 1135 
S.Ct. 236, 121 L.Ed.2d 236 (1992) (repetition of instruction on 
use of circumstantial evidence to show mental intent harmless 
error). In this case, however, the issue was not whether a 
robbery was committed, but whether Loretto was an accomplice. 
The repetition of the elements instruction was misleading because 
it unduly emphasized the evidence going to the issue of whether a 
robbery was committed, and minimized the importance of the 
evidence going to the issue of whether Loretto aided in the 
commission of the robbery. 
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POINT IV: BECAUSE THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE 
CONCEPT, WAS MISLEADING, AND CONFUSING, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH 
A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS INSTRUCTION. 
The reasonable doubt instruction given by the court fails 
to explain the concept in any meaningful way. This instruction 
is not only confusing and misleading, but by virtue of the way it 
is phrased and constructed, it minimizes the State's burden of 
proof. The following is the text of the reasonable doubt 
instruction given in this case. The sentences have been numbered 
for easy reference. 
(1) All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) And, in 
case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his 
guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to 
an acquittal. (3) I have heretofore told you 
that the burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (4) 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to an absolute certainty. (5) Now by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based 
on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. (6) It must be a reasonable 
doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or 
imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. (7) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, 
convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it, and 
obviates all reasonable doubt. (8) A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women 
would entertain, and it must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of the evidence in this 
case. 
On its face, Instruction 6 does not appear to lessen the 
State's burden of proof. However, in construing a reasonable 
doubt instruction, the court must consider "how reasonable jurors 
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could have understood the charge as a whole." State v. Gonzales, 
822 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).7 
A deconstructive analysis of the text gives insight into how 
reasonable jurors could have understood this instruction. 
A deconstructive analysis of textual discourse focuses 
upon the ambiguities and or contradictions that a text exhibits 
in terms of its intended meaning. In fact, deconstruction is 
interested in the way the text subverts itself in terms of its 
consciously intended meanings, and may be shown to exhibit 
messages or assumptions which may not be intended, but are 
nonetheless communicated.8 A careful analysis of the way this 
instruction is constructed and phrased reveals a bias against the 
defendant. 
The subtext of Sentence 2 presumes the guilt of the 
defendant and implies that his guilt need only be shown to the 
satisfaction of the jury. Sentence 2 states, "And, in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal." The main portion of the 
7
 Gonzales adopted the standard of review in Cage v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, 341 (1990). The 
Supreme Court has since reviewed challenges to jury instructions to 
determine "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the 
Constitution." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S. Ct. 475, 
116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399 (1991). Issues of standard of review are a 
matter of state law. Absent a direct federal mandate, Utah courts 
are not bound by federal standards of review. State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1268 (Utah 1993). 
8
 See Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Theory and 
Criticism After Structuralism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York, 1982). 
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sentence, "And in case of a reasonable doubt he is entitled to an 
acquittal" is modified by the phrase shown in italics. The main 
sentence is straightforward enough. However, the modifying 
phrase presumes the defendant is guilty. The phrase "his guilt" 
assumes that guilt exists. To "show" means to reveal or 
demonstrate something known, but hidden or not obvious. The 
phrase, "whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown" suggests that 
it is the State's burden to merely satisfactorily show what the 
State already knows, that the defendant is guilty. Additionally, 
the State need only demonstrate to the jury's "satisfaction" 
that the defendant is guilty. 
Sentence 4, "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to an absolute certainty" is also misleading. 
Though a correct statement of the law, the placement of this 
statement in the reasonable doubt instruction minimizes the 
importance of reasonable doubt to the defendant. Immediately 
after telling the jury that the burden of proof lies with the 
State, the instruction does not convey to the jury that the 
benefit of uncertainty should go to the defendant, but instead 
talks about the level of doubt the State is entitled to have. 
Sentence 4 appears to give the benefit of doubt to the State and 
not the defendant. Sentence 4 tells the jury that the proof or 
evidence that the State offers does not have to be absolutely 
certain. The implied suggestion is that the State has the 
benefit of a degree of doubt as to the certainty of its proof. 
The purpose of a reasonable doubt instruction is to inform the 
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jury that uncertainty or doubt goes to the benefit of the 
defendant. The placement of this statement at the beginning of 
the instruction undermines that purpose to the detriment of the 
defendant. Jurors are told that the defendant is entitled to 
acquittal if there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Then 
in the next breath they are told that if they are not absolutely 
certain of the defendant's guilt, they can still convict. 
Lastly, the structure of the text is dedicated to 
limiting the application of the concept of reasonable doubt. The 
text narrows the definition of reasonable doubt almost to the 
point of non-existence. The text begins by telling the jury that 
the defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, (sentence 1 & 3). The text then begins to 
narrow the definition of reasonable doubt by telling the jury 
everything that reasonable doubt is not. Sentence 4 tells the 
jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not absolute 
certainty. Sentence 6 states that reasonable doubt is not 
fanciful, is not imaginary and is not based wholly on 
speculation. The only sentences that attempt to affirmatively 
define reasonable doubt are hopelessly circular in their logic. 
Sentences 5, 7 and 8, in essence, tell the jury that reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which is reasonable. 
The entire explanation of the concept of reasonable doubt 
is framed in the negative. This negative framing narrows the 
definition of reasonable doubt as the reader goes through the 
text. The text limits the application of reasonable doubt like a 
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funnel, to the degree that the reader begins to question whether 
reasonable doubt even exists. The structure of the text 
discourages the jury from attempting to apply the concept and 
suggests that it has a very narrow meaning and application. 
The reasonable doubt instruction is the "prime 
instruction for reducing the risk of convictions resting on 
factual error." Cage, 498 U.S. at 40. Cage implicitly supports 
the argument that "reasonable doubt" is not self-defining since 
the Court rejected the Cage instruction despite repeated usage of 
the term "reasonable doubt." At worst, Instruction 6 presumes 
guilt and lowers the State's burden of proof. At best, it is 
confusing and fails completely to give the jury guidance or a 
workable definition of reasonable doubt. 
The trial court must adequately define the concept of 
reasonable doubt. Failure to do so is error. For that reason, 
the trial court should have provided the jury with Loretto's 
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction. State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) held that the reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction was simply another way of expressing the 
concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Jd. at 799. 
Implicit in James is the understanding that if the concept of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not adequately defined, the 
defendant may be entitled to an alternative instruction. 
Loretto recognizes that this Court has approved the 
reasonable doubt instruction given in this case in State v. 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also Gonzales, 
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822 P.2d at 1218; State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). Even if the reasonable doubt instruction does not violate 
constitutional requirements, it is so poorly drafted that a 
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction should have been 
given to the jury. See Haston, 811 P.2d at 932 (this reasonable 
doubt instruction is "not a model of lucidity and simplicity"). 
Loretto maintains that the reasonable doubt instruction 
in this case is biased against the defendant. The subtext of the 
instruction, when taken as a whole, could easily be understood by 
reasonable jurors to minimize the importance of reasonable doubt, 
lower the State's burden of proof and imply that there is a 
presumption of guilt. Instruction 6 contains an underlying bias 
which subverts the intended meaning of the text and sends a 
message that reasonable doubt is a very narrow and limited 
concept, and that proof which is "satisfactory" is sufficient to 
convict. 
Cage considered the instruction as a whole. The Court 
rejected the argument that the offending statements were harmless 
when viewed in the context of the entire instruction. The giving 
of a constitutionally defective reasonable doubt instruction 
requires reversal. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 
S.Ct. 2078 (1993). Loretto is entitled to new trial. A case 
based on circumstantial evidence of accomplice liability 
illustrates the importance of an adequate reasonable doubt 
instruction. Had the jury been given a sufficient reasonable 
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doubt instruction, or a reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction, the jury may have acquitted him. 
Pedersen approved of the instruction because it did not 
contain the problematic language identified in State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989). However, the problems Loretto has 
identified with the instruction were not specifically addressed 
in Pedersen and its progeny. To the extent that Loretto's 
argument is inconsistent with Pedersen and subsequent cases, he 
respectfully requests this Court reconsider its holding in 
Pedersen. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO 
GRANT THE APPELLANT A CONTINUANCE SO COUNSEL 
COULD ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE CASE BY 
INTERVIEWING A POTENTIAL DEFENSE WITNESS. 
Five days prior to trial, defense counsel requested a 
continuance so as to follow up on a new lead to locate a 
potential defense witness. R. 191. The trial had been continued 
once before at the State's request. R. 77-80. The record shows 
the following discussion took place: 
THE COURT: This is on for a pretrial conference. 
Are you ready to go to trial? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Quite frankly, we're not, Your 
Honor. We're still trying to find a witness. 
Your Honor, we've found a lead and trying to 
locate him. We have the name and phone number of 
somebody who we believe knows this witness that 
we're looking for. And we have left messages 
with that person, but have not received any 
return phone calls yet. We don't have an address 
for the friend of the witness so we can't go 
there and look for him. We are just simply 
relying on making the phone calls and hoping that 
he is going to call back. We are hoping that 
we'll be able to find this witness and because 
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we've not been able to make contact with that 
witness yet we are not prepared for trial, and 
would ask the court to continue the matter, and 
allow us a little more time to try and locate 
him. Just recently gotten the phone number for 
the friend. We have been previously trying to 
find a witness but without any further 
information about who he is associated with it 
has been difficult. 
R. 192. The State indicated that it was ready to proceed, and 
had subpoenaed an out of state witness. The State did not oppose 
nor stipulate to defense counsel's motion to continue. R. 193. 
Defense counsel was naturally unable to make a proffer as to what 
the witness's testimony would be, as she had been unable to 
contact him. R. 193. 
When moving for a continuance, the moving party 
must show that denial of the motion will prevent 
the party from obtaining material and admissible 
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks 
can be produced within a reasonable time, and 
that it has exercised due diligence in preparing 
for the case before requesting the continuance. 
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The court abused it discretion by refusing to give 
counsel additional time to adequately investigate the case. An 
essential component of procedural due process is the right of the 
accused to have an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense.9 
State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Trial 
counsel has a duty to investigate the facts of the case, 
9
. Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
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interview prospective defense witnesses, and procure defense 
witnesses. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) . 
Counsel must interview a potential defense witness before a 
reasonable decision can be made whether or not to call the 
witness at trial. Id. 
The trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's 
request for a continuance prevented her from performing her duty 
to her client to adequately prepare his case for trial. This 
constituted an abuse of discretion. "Abuse of discretion may be 
found where a party has made timely objections, given necessary 
notice and made a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset 
for good cause." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1982). Counsel made her request five days before trial. 
Counsel had only recently received new information that would 
assist her in locating the witness. Her failure to interview the 
witness prior to her request for a continuance was not as a 
result of her failure to exercise due diligence, and her request 
for the continuance was timely. While the State may have been 
inconvenienced by a continuance, the State did not claim that it 
would be prejudiced. R. 193. See, Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 413 
(denial of continuance not an abuse of discretion where the State 
indicated that a delay may hamper its ability to produce its 
witnesses). 
Without adequate time to locate and interview the 
witness, counsel could not proffer what the testimony of the 
witness would be at trial. And yet because counsel could not 
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say if the witness's testimony would be material or admissible, 
the court denied the request for more time. R. 192-93. 
Confidence in an adversarial system of criminal justice can only 
be had when the defendant is given every opportunity to present 
evidence in his behalf. Loretto was prejudiced by the court's 
refusal to allow him adequate time to investigate all potential 
defense witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the Appellant respectfully 
requests this Court reverse his conviction for insufficient 
evidence. In the alternative, Appellant requests this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand with orders for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this JiL±L day of A ^ , ^ J L A , 1996 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMF.isrnitfTr^rr *7TT 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship —• Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. 
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors 
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Civil actions, right to 
jury trial in, U.R.C.P., Rules 38, 39. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abatement of nuisance. 
Capital cases. 
Civil cases. 
—Nature of issue. 
Concurrence of three-fourths of jurors. 
Consolidation of actions. 
Guilty plea. 




Number of jurors. 
Paternity proceedings. 
Request for jury trial. 
Reversal of verdict. 
Unanimous verdict. 
Waiver of jury trial. 
Abatement of nuisance. 
Former section regarding abatement of 
brothel as nuisance, insofar as it provided for 
imprisonment and authorized court in equity 
proceedings to impose jail sentence, held un-
constitutional as violating this section. State 
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76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
History. C. 1953, 76-2-202, enacted by L. Wildlife Resources Code, § 23-20-23. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-202. Obstructing justice, § 76-8-306. 





(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-301, enacted by L. Cross-References. —Assault, § 76-5-102. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-301. Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Taking of property. 
A.. A Threats. 
Attempt.
 C i t e d 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. Attempt 
—Testimony. Trial court's failure to instruct that in order 
Intent. to convict of attempted robbery the jury must 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 














































I work at a , 
right. All right. Well, < 
excused? 
No objection. 
Mrs • Bingham, we111 excuse you 







Bingham left the courtroom.) 
s forge ahead with Mr. Bart 
am Bart Rowland, living in 
screening, printing shirts 
West 
and I'm 
not married. No kids, and that's it. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do you belong to any clubs 
or organizations? 
MR. ROWLAND: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Rowland, do you take any 
publications, newspapers, magazines or anything of that 
nature? 
MR. ROWLAND: No. I don't. 
THE COURT: And tell us, what about your 
education, if you would. 
MR. ROWLAND: Ifve got--went to Grade 12 but have 
not obtained my G.E.D. 




























like this. I am prejudiced because I just look at his 
appearance and I think what— 
THE COURT: HOW long ago did this occur? 
MS. BINGHAM: September. Miss him so bad. 
THE COURT: Do you think that it would be 
difficult for you to sit through this trial and concentrate 
on these issues? 
MS. BINGHAM: It would be. One is a young man who 
is my son's build and everything. Just hard. Just really, 
really hard. Hopefully we won't have to talk about our kids 
just right here (indicating). I don't want to do this. I 
don't know what I want to do. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. This will be the last time 
you would have to discuss your children at all and then you 
would be required to just serve, listen to all of the 
evidence, probably take about two days, concentrate on it 
and determine whether or not the State had met their burden 
and proved their case. Do you think you could do that or 
would there be emotional pressure if you were doing that? 
MS. BINGHAM: I'm a very emotional person. We 
live next door to a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs 
and he—he dressed just like he did. I can't understand. 
Why can't he shave that thing off the back of his head? I'm 
sorry. I don't know if I could be fair. 
(The jury was referring to the defendant at this 
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tomorrow. Is that right, Counsel? 
MS. REMAL: I believe so, yes. 
THE COURT: We'll be here tomorrow afternoon in 
this trial. And I assume that that would interfere with 
your high school graduation. 
MS. DRAPER: I think it would. 
THE COURT: Which high school is it? 
MS. DRAPER: He is at Hunter High School. 
THE COURT: And this is beginning at 2:30, did you 
say? 
MS. DRAPER: We're supposed to meet at 2:00 
o'clock as a family to go there. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any objection 
if this witness—this juror is excused? 























you through the rest 
at thi 
: I am Helen Bingham. 
I am prejudiced when I see a young 
of my son, Monty. You wanted—you 
kids 
basket case. 
That's a little hard. 





s time and you 
I lost a son to 
l man. I keep 
asked me to talk 
an emotional 
even if it was 
Members of the jury, I thank you for your 
patience. It took a little longer than we had anticipated. 
I have one final question I would like to ask each] 
of you. Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who 
had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite 
emotional as she responded to some of my questions. 
And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some 
personal prejudices in connection with this case. And 
perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not 
entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that 
concerned her about this case and in connection with the 
defendant in this case. 
Anyone here who feels that they were influenced byl 
those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would make it 
difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon her 
comments? Anyone? No response. 
Anything else, Counsel? 
Mr. Tanner? Yes. 
MR. TANNER: I misunderstood what your question 
is. I did put in two six-months period in the jury about 34j 
years ago. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And was that a 
criminal case or a civil case? 
MR. TANNER: Civil. 




INSTRUCTION NO. ( ^  
Under the law of the State of Utah, robbery is the unlawful 
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits 
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, that 
person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or causes 
serious bodily injury upon another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Gilbert Loretto, Jr., 
of the offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 10th day of January, 1995, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gilbert Loretto, Jr., 
as a party took personal property then in the possession of Keri 
Flores, from the person or immediate presence of Keri Flores; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Keri Flores; 
and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a 
dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in the information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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